Benchmarking: A New and Useful Tool for Policy Learning? by Jan Fagerberg
Benchmarking: A New and Useful Tool for Policy Learning? 
By Jan Fagerberg 
ISSUE:  
 
“Benchmarking” is a hot issue these days. Why? One way to look at it is that it is just 
another of those fancy concepts from the management literature that from time to time 
succeeds in finding its way from the business schools to the policy discourse. However, 
this paper, taking a broad historical perspective to the subject, argues the practice 
nowadays identified as “benchmarking” is not at all new and, moreover, that it may be a 
very useful exercise. 
RELEVANCE: 
This paper argues that the reasons for the increasing popularity of “benchmarking” have 
to do with the failure of much theory in this area to address real policy issues. The 
theoretical rationale of “benchmarking” is considered, followed by a discussion of a 
recent benchmarking exercise by  the European Commission (European Commission 
2001).   
  1INTRODUCTION 
 
“Benchmarking” is a hot issue these days. Why? One way to look at it is that it is just 
another of those fancy concepts from the management literature that from time to time 
succeeds in finding its way from the business schools to the offices of the commission 
and related places within the member countries.  Take for instance Michael Porter’s 
“diamond” a decade ago (Porter 1990):  At the time it attracted a lot of interest but in the 
end the value for policy-makers was more limited. In one sense it is probably correct to 
say that benchmarking is a bit of the same. But as we shall see, although the concept may 
be new in this particular context, the practice it describes is not new at all. The reasons 
for this that, it is argued, have to do with the failure of much theory in this area to address 
real policy issues.  Finally, the paper considers some recent benchmarking exercises of 
the Commission (European Commission 2001), to see what lessons might be drawn from 
these for further work in this area. 
  2A STEAMER FROM YOKOHAMA 
 
In December 1871 a steamer left Yokohama for the United States. On board were around 
fifty Japanese officials, including some very high-ranking people, and a number of 
students that were to be deployed in various Western universities. The officials, however, 
were on a mission to seek recognition for the new Japanese regime and to examine those 
aspects of Western civilization that could be most profitably borrowed by Japan. The 
mission spent seven months in the US before it went to Europe, where it paid visits to 
Britain, France, Germany and several other countries. It inspected governmental 
departments, the judiciary system, the military, banks, schools, factories etc.  Their 
impressions and assessments were laid down in a report that was published in five 
volumes in 1878, and which was, according to historian William Beasley, “a guide to 
Western-style modernizations in all it aspects” (Beasley 1990, p. 87). 
  
The economist Michio Morishima describes the impact as follows: 
 
“These men brought back with them a wealth of new knowledge and information 
concerning the modern state. The Meiji government compared and examined all this 
information to judge which country was the most outstanding and advanced in each 
sphere, for example which country was best in terms of its education system, which 
country for the navy and which for the army. In each country they investigated the 
conditions of such things as the police, industry and finance. On the basis of the 
information (...) the government made its decision as to which sphere should be patterned 
on which country. For example, the education system (…) was patterned on the French 
system of school districts. The Imperial Japanese Navy was a copy of the Royal Navy, 
(…). The telegraph and railways followed the British example, universities the American. 
The Meiji Constitution and the Civil Code were of German origin, but the Criminal Code 
was of French origin. In this way the Meiji state was a hotchpotch of Britain, the United 
States, France and Germany.”  (Morishima 1982, p. 88-9)  
 
In the present context “benchmarking” may be defined as a comparative analysis of 
country performance that attempts to identify best practice in different (policy) areas ( a 
tool for policy learning). Arguably, the Japanese case involves all the characteristic 
elements of benchmarking; use of detailed comparative analysis, identification of best 
practice and application of what is learnt in the domestic context. The latter, it must be 
noted, was by no means an easy process, since the conditions in Japan at that time 
obviously differed a lot from those of the leading countries in the West. Hence, 
successful application of what was learnt required a good deal of local adaptation, 
including an understanding of the wider effects of changing one central part of the 
system. Morishima makes a valid point, therefore, when he concludes that “it was quite 
impossible for Japan to carry out an industrial revolution and become a powerful 
country by the same historical process as Britain had done. Japan was fated to follow a 
different path from the very beginning.” (ibid.)  
  3THE RATIONALE FOR BENCHMARKING 
 
Hence, benchmarking is by no means a new technique in policy learning, it has been 
going on for a long time (and not in Japan only). The reasons for this, we shall argue, 
have to do with the failure of much theory in this area to address real policy issues.  
Much formal theorising in the social sciences, and in economics in particular, is based on 
deduction from set of basic postulates of human behaviour (that are normally not tested 
or even testable), and hence tends to come up with rather general messages on what 
politicians should do (and – in particular – not do) that are at best only vaguely related to 
the specific context in which these policies are  to be applied. This lack of appreciation of 
the role of context (and context-specific knowledge) in policy-advice may lead to quite 
disappointing results, as witnessed for instance by the role of the IMF and World Bank 
(and academics linked to these organisations) in the early years of the transition process 
in the former Soviet Union. Many bureaucrats and policy-makers have of course known 
this all along, and hence invented practices that, like present benchmarking exercises, 
attempt to improve policies by learning from systematic comparative work. The 
knowledge that comes out of these exercises may be seen as a kind of “theory” although 
of a different nature than the formal type mentioned above. Rather it is an example of 
what the economists Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter have labeled “appreciative 
theory” (Nelson and Winter 1982), i.e., theorising that stays close to the empirical nitty-
gritty, attempts to outline and interpret “stylised facts” and find out what the implications 
for policy may be. 
 
A strand of “appreciative theorising” that may be relevant for benchmarking is that 
associated with the study of the policies pursued by countries attempting to catch up with 
the technologically and economically more advanced ones. The economic historian 
Alexander Gerschenkron is often recognized as a pioneer in the study of such processes.  
His favorite example was Germany’s attempt to catch up with Britain a century ago. 
While, when Britain industrialized technology was small scale and hence institutionally 
not very demanding, these conditions were according to Gerschenkron radically altered in 
the nineteenth century when Germany started to catch up. What he particularly had in 
mind was the seemingly inbuilt tendency of modern technology to require ever larger and 
more complex plants, with similarly changing requirements with respect to the physical, 
financial and institutional infrastructure.  Hence, to succeed in catching up in such 
dynamic, scale-intensive industries, catching-up countries had in Gerschenkron’s view to 
create new “institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in the 
established industrial country” (Gerschenkron 1962., p. 7). The purpose of these would 
be to mobilize resources to undertake the necessary investments (structural changes) at 
the new and radically enlarged scale that modern technology required. Thus, following 
this view, emulation of institutions and policies at work in countries with superior 
technological and economic performance is by no means a guarantee for successful 
catch-up. 
 
More recently the economic historian Moses Abramovitz, has applied the concepts 
“technological congruence” and “social capability” to the discussion of the “absorptive 
capacity” of late-comers (Abramovitz 1994). The first concept refers to the degree to 
which leader and follower country characteristics are congruent in areas such as market 
  4size, factor supply etc. The second points to the various efforts and capabilities that 
backward countries have to develop in order to catch up, such as improving education, 
infrastructure and, more generally, technological capabilities (R&D facilities etc.). He 
explains the successful catch up of Western Europe in relation to the USA in the post-war 
period as the result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social 
capabilities. As an example of the former he mentions how European economic 
integration led to the creation of larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, 
facilitating the transfer of scale-intensive technologies initially developed for US 
conditions. Regarding the latter, he points among other things to such factors as the 
general increases in educational levels, the rise in the share of resources devoted to public 
and private sector R&D and how good the financial system is in mobilizing resources for 
change.   
 
Arguably, the concepts suggested in this literature may be of interest for the design 
benchmarking exercises. For instance the concept “technological congruence” points to 
the fact that technological progress is not “neutral” with respect to national 
characteristics. Hence one has to be specific in trying to sort out what the potential and 
requirements of the progressive technologies of the day really are (since these change 
over time), and how these requirements can be fulfilled in different settings and under 
different conditions.  “Social capability”, on the other hand, points to the fact that there 
factors at the economy-wide (national, regional) level that matter a lot for the ability of 
firms to create, use and benefit from new technologies, and which in many cases go 
beyond what is often regarded as directly relevant for RTD policies. Thus, to be really 
helpful as in input to policy learning in that area, benchmarking exercises may need to 
cast the net rather widely and include for instance factors of relevance for the spread of 
new technologies (and not just their creation). 
 
However, the most important lesson from this literature is that institutions and policies 
cannot be uncritically copied and transferred from a frontier country to a country trying to 
mobilize resources to catch up. It might of course be objected that the lessons the 
literature on “catching up” may be more relevant for developing than for developed 
countries. But in the dynamic world that we live the frontier is continually on the move, 
and at different speeds in different areas, so that most countries or regions will be behind 
the frontier most of the time. Although there may be a lot to learn from what is done 
elsewhere, policy makers must take into account specific context in their own country 
when engaging in policy learning. In fact, as argued by Gerschenkron, they may in the 
end have to implement institutions and policies that never existed in countries with 
superior technological and economic performance (i.e., countries that tend to be 










  5BENCHMARKING NATIONAL RESEARCH POLICIES IN EUROPE 
Under this heading the European Commission has circulated a set of indicators assumed 
to be of relevance for benchmarking (European Commission 2001). The indicators, 
which cover the period 1995-2000, range from scientific activities, R&D and innovation, 
structural factors to economic performance (growth, exports). The important question to 
address in this context is of course what can be learnt from such an exercise. We will do 
this by summarizing the main trends in the data and point to some important 
issues/questions that arise. Unfortunately, space does not allow us to document these 
trends in an extensive manner, so readers interested in a more detailed account will have 
to consult the original source. 
  
First, what these indicators clearly show is that there are important differences in the 
distribution of scientific activities, R&D and innovation in Europe, with a group of 
smaller, developed Northern countries in the lead, the larger European countries in the 
middle and the less-developed countries lagging. The group of small-country technology 
leaders includes Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands. The two former, in 
particular, excel on nearly every indicator of scientific or technological performance. For 
instance, R&D as a share of GDP in these two countries in 2000 was in the 3-4 % range, 
well above global leaders such as the USA or Japan, and far ahead of other European 
countries.  The larger countries (Germany, France, the UK and Italy) cluster towards the 
middle of the list on most of these indicators, usually with Germany in the lead and Italy 
lagging (the German performance is especially good on patenting in which it rivals the 
frontier countries). Finally, the less developed countries in  Europe (Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece) clearly also have less-developed scientific and technological 
capabilities, with Ireland well ahead of the others. 
  
However, one should not over-focus on this apparent north-south divide, because the 
main message that comes out of these data is that there are important changes taking 
place in the distribution of these activities over time. Some countries appear to be 
technologically much more dynamic than others. This includes, in particular, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Finland, which stand out by having the strongest increases in scientific and 
technological capabilities over the period (as measured by the indicators). The 
performance of Finland is especially noteworthy, since it had quite high levels to begin 
with. Other countries that show some dynamism, though less, include Spain and Greece 
in the South, and the remaining small, developed economies in Northern and Central 
Europe. The larger economies by contrast show clear signs of a stagnating level of 
scientific and technological competence.  
 
An important issue is to what extent these changes (in the distribution of scientific and 
technological capabilities) go hand in hand with changes growth or trade performance as 
generally seems to be the case in the long run (Fagerberg 1996). However, in this case 
some diversity might be expected because the time span is rather short (five years) and 
there obviously also are other factors at play.  Still, the tree most “dynamic” countries in 
terms of technological capabilities, Ireland, Finland and Portugal, also are among the 
fastest growers in terms of labour productivity. Other countries that grew relatively fast 
include Austria, Greece and Sweden, all countries with medium technological dynamism. 
Most of the large countries cluster towards the middle.  As for trade performance in so-
  6called high tech products, the EU study reports that the best performance is recorded for 
Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Greece and Sweden, i.e., countries with high or 
medium technological dynamism. The exception appears to be Portugal with a very 
dismal performance in high-tech trade. 
 
Summing up, a first conclusion is that there is clearly much more diversity among the 
smaller economies than the larger ones. The larger European economies generally appear 
less dynamic than many of the smaller economies both with respect to upgrading science, 
R&D and innovation and to performance. Is this a pure aggregation effect? Is the large 
difference in size simply hiding the fact that there are large differences in dynamism 
within the larger economies? If so it raises the question of what the correct level for 
benchmarking really is. May be the smaller European economies should be compared 
with regions within the larger countries? This question is especially relevant since many 
of these regions, such as for instance the German “länder”, actually have a lot to say 
when it comes to policy.  
 
Second, there are clear signs of a process of technological catching-up taking place 
within Europe, with a group of less-developed economies narrowing the gap in scientific 
and technological capabilities at a very high speed. However, with a partial exception for 
Ireland, the gaps remain very substantial. Finland or Sweden, for instance, do three to 
four times as much R&D (as a share of GDP) as do Spain and Portugal, with Greece at an 
even lower level. Other indicators of technological capability confirm this pattern. As is 
now commonly acknowledged, the progressive technologies today are to a much larger 
extent than previously based exploitation of science, organized R&D and highly skilled 
labour (Fagerberg et al. 1999).  This raises the question of to what extent the efforts 
undertaken by these countries in generating such technological capabilities – or 
“absorptive capacity” – are sufficient for catch-up to be sustainable in the longer run. A 
comparison – or “benchmarking” – with other countries that have been catching up 
rapidly during the last decades such as, for instance, some of the so-called “newly 
industrializing countries” in Asia may be helpful in this regard. One fact that would have 
been revealed by such a comparison is that some of these Asian economies, Korea and 
Taiwan in particular (Lall 2000), have for several years now invested heavily 
technological capabilities, so that today their capabilities are far ahead of the catching-up 
countries in Europe. 
 
Third, some small developed countries, notably Finland but also some others, appear to 
“forge ahead” of the larger economies. Clearly some of the smaller developed countries 
in Europe have succeeded much better than the larger ones in upgrading its scientific and 
technological infrastructure. This difference, it may be noted, also holds for the diffusion 
(use) of ICT in the economy (Fagerberg et al. 1999). Is it something peculiar with the 
technologically progressive industries of to day that favours small economies (superior 
“technological congruence”)?  Or is it simply so that most of the smaller, developed 
economies have adapted to the challenge posted by recent technological shifts in a better 
way? If so what were the factors (capabilities) behind this superior adaptation? 
  
Arguably, the indicators discussed here are helpful in identifying important issues and 
trends. However, as indicated by some of the questions raised above, they are of little 
help when it comes to explain the observed differences in performance across countries 
and time. To answer such deeper questions, deeper studies are required.  
  7CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Benchmarking is not new, and history has shown it to be a quite useful approach.   
Arguably, systematic comparison is always useful, because it increases our knowledge 
about differences and similarities, and helps us to pose new questions. However, as 
illustrated by the historical approaches referred to in this paper, the role of institutions 
and policies must be analysed in their proper context. Although some of the challenges 
facing European countries today may be the same, the options for responding to these 
challenges may differ a lot, depending on contextual factors such as systems of 
governance, industrial specialization, skills, R&D infrastructure etc. Arguably, naïve 
attempts to transplant policies or institutions from one setting to another without 
considering the role of the broader context may be do more harm than good. Thus, while 
aggregate statistics of the sort discussed above may be very helpful in identifying issues 
of relevance for policy makers, it will not in itself provide a sufficient basis for 
formulating policy. To that end a deeper, more systemic understanding of the working on 
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